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INTRODUCTION

It is November 2011. Negotiations between Verizon Communications
and two unions, representing field technicians and call center employees, reach
an impasse.' Verizon, citing a declining industry, seeks health insurance and
pension concessions from employees in the landline division.2 The
Communication Workers of America and International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers refuse. 3 Across the nation, 45,000 workers walk out. 4 Seventy percent
of the employees at Verizon's Clarksburg call center location participate in the
strike. 5 The dispute lasts for two weeks-the largest walkout in four years.6 Call
volume at the Clarksburg location drops precipitously. 7 The facility pivots its
operational focus from customer service to customer retention during the labor
dispute. 8
For the duration of the labor dispute, the Verizon employees on strike
collected unemployment benefits. 9 The unemployment compensation statute
permitted collection because the Verizon call center did not suffer a "stoppage
of work" at the Clarksburg location.' 0 Indeed, under West Virginia's
unemployment compensation scheme, the availability of benefits for striking

I

Steven Greenhouse, Citing Stalemate, Verizon Workers Strike, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2011),

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/us/07verizon.html.
2
Id.
4

Id.
Id.

5

Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Bd. of Review of Workforce W. Va., No. 12-1106, 2013 WL

3

5967047, at *4 (W. Va. Nov. 8, 2013).
6
Steven Greenhouse, Verizon Workers Plan to End Strike, Agreeing to Revive Talks Toward
a
Contract,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
20,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/2 1/technology/verizon-workers-end-strike-though-withoutnew-contract.html.
Verizon Servs. Corp., 2013 WL 5967047, at *1.
Id. at *1, 6 (estimating a decline in call volume between 50% and 68.2%).
9
10

Id. at *4.
Id.
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employees hinged on whether the employer suffered a "stoppage of work.""
That is, until April of 2017, when the West Virginia Legislature amended the
statute.' 2
Most readers likely jumped to their own conclusion as to whether the
Verizon employees should have been entitled to benefits-conversations about
labor disputes and unemployment benefits will invariably strike a political nerve.
Proponents of a more readily available system of unemployment benefits cite the
moral concerns of providing for the needy.1 3 Economic concerns might also
support expanding the benefits system; claimants tend to consume more, and
expanding benefits could stimulate consumer industries. 14
Critics of an expansive benefits system cite budgetary concerns and
argue that tax burdens placed on employers hinder economic development.' 5
Critics also fear that a government-sponsored safety net discourages claimants
from making difficult employment decisions.' 6 A laborer's ability to freely make
these decisions is an essential aspect of a free market economy, 7 -readily
available benefits might tip the scale.
Labor opinions are no less controversial. Pro-business camps rush to;
blame economic hardships on pro-labor stances,' 8 and vice versa. Policymakers
have long struggled to strike the balance of power between laborers and
employers. A balance that favors laborers too heavily could hinder industrial
development; a balance that favors employers too heavily could facilitate unfair
or oppressive working conditions.
This Note falls at the intersection between unemployment benefits and
labor disputes by exploring a touchy question: under what circumstances are
employees on strike entitled to unemployment benefits? There are real-world

II
12

Id. at *4-5.
See S.B. 222, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2017).

13
See Paula Dwyer, The Case for Extending Jobless Benefits, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Dec. 27,
2013, 3:55 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2013-12-27/the-case-for-extendingjobless-benefits.
14
Mohamed A. El-Erian, Extending Unemployment Benefits Makes Good Economic Sense,
Too, HUFFPOST (last updated Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mohamed-aelerian/extending-unemployment-benefits b_4546245.html. Benefit recipients have a high
marginal propensity to consume. Id.
Chris Edwards, No Free Lunch in Subsidy Programs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Dec.

'

9,

2011,

10:50 AM),

http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-congress-extend-federal-

unemployment-benefits/no-free-lunch-in-subsidy-programs. Chris Edwards of the CATO Institute
argues that "[r]ather than stimulating anything, [budgetary deficits such as unemployment benefits]
are destabilizing financial markets and damaging business confidence." Id.

16

Id.

17

Id.

1

Meg Sullivan, Hoover's pro-laborstance helped cause great depression, UCLA economist
says, UCLA NEWSROOM (Aug. 28, 2009), http://newsroom.ucla.edu/releases/pandering-to-laborcaused-great-91447.
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consequences. By wrongfully extending benefits to striking workers, employers
fear that the state might provide fuel to a labor dispute. 19 To add insult to injury,
unemployment compensation is funded by a payroll tax levied on employers.2 0
On the other hand, if benefits are wrongfully withheld, the humanitarian aims of
unemployment compensation would be frustrated.
Even-handed claim resolution is essential for such a politically charged
question. The Author will do his best to avoid result-based reasoning. Instead, he
will argue for a clear, easy-to-apply approach. The "stoppage of work" inquirythe majority view that ruled the day from 1936 until April 2017 in West
Virginia-is not the answer. The new West Virginia statute, which removes the
"stoppage of work" test, while preserving some of its features designed to protect
certain claimants, offers a creative way forward. The new law is not perfect, but
it can be clearly applied, and it offers employers and employees predictable
outcomes. Other states should take note.
II. BACKGROUND
This Part will detail the state of labor dispute disqualification law.
Section II.A will provide a broad overview of the history of unemployment
compensation and the principles that underlie labor dispute disqualification.
Section II.B will examine specific labor dispute disqualification statutes,
including the recent change in West Virginia law.
A.

Labor Dispute Disqualification,Generally

A general overview of unemployment compensation-and labor dispute
disqualification-is necessary before diving into specific statutes. This Section
will provide this overview by explaining the origins of unemployment
compensation and then exploring the broad principles underlying labor dispute
disqualification.
1.

Historical Overview of Unemployment Compensation

State-levied unemployment compensation schemes first gained serious
traction in the United States in the New Deal era.21 Proponents saw
unemployment compensation as an insurance plan to help the state raise funds

19
See Loc. Union No. 11 v. Gordon, 71 N.E.2d 637, 642 (Ill. 1947) (hesitating to "attribute to
the legislature an intent to finance strikes out of unemployment compensation funds").
20
Social Security: Unemployment Insurance, VCU LIBRARIES: Soc. WELFARE HISTORY
PROJECT,
http://socialwelfare.1ibrary.vcu.edu/social-security/social-security-unemploymentinsurance/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) [hereinafter Unemployment Insurance].
21
Edwin E. Witte, An HistoricalAccount of Unemployment Insurance in the Social Security
Act, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 157-58 (1936).
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during economic booms and disburse them in times of hardship. 22 Stanley King,
an early unemployment compensation theorist, articulated the policy concerns of
the day:
The fundamental case for unemployment protection lies in the
fact that under a democratic form of society we are forced to
prevent any large scale starvation. Funds must be provided
somehow .... It is practical sense to build a system which will
gather the funds in good times and disburse them in bad times.
This simple theory underlies all formal proposals for
unemployment insurance, for unemployment reserves.2 3
Through the early 1930s, however, the vast majority of unemployment
compensation efforts died on the floors of state legislatures. 24 Only Wisconsin
managed to pass a compensation program.25 Contemporary economist Edwin
Witte explained this failure of state-initiated programs, citing the concern of the
"heavy burden on employers [within] the state which would handicap them in
competition with employers from states not having such a law." 26 Meanwhile, as
state-led efforts failed, the national unemployment rate rose to 25% of the labor
force.27
In 1935, Congress stepped in and passed the Social Security Act, which
incentivized states to implement compensation schemes by imposing a uniform
federal payroll tax. 2 8 Congress granted employers a tax credit-up to 90% of the
federal payroll tax-for the amount contributed to a state-run unemployment
compensation program. 2 9 These funds are generally called "unemployment
insurance" programs 30-West Virginia uses the moniker "Workforce West
Virginia." 31 By 1937, each state had enacted an unemployment compensation

22

See generally Unemployment Insurance, supra note 20.

23

Stanley King, Unemployment Reserves and Insurance, 23 AM. LAB. LEGIS. REv. 170, 170

(1933).
24

Witte, supra note 21.

Wisconsin Unemployment Compensation Act of 1932, ch. 20, 1932 Wis. SESS. LAws 57,
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/1931 /related/acts/31ssact020.pdf.
25

26

Witte, supra note 21.
Gene Smiley, The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics: Great Depression, LIBRRARY OF
ECON. & LIBERTY, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/GreatDepression.html (last visited Nov. 7,
27

2017).
28

Witte, supra note 21.

29

Id.

30

See id.

31

Unemployment, WORKFORCE W. VA., http://workforcewv.org/unemployment.html

(last

visited Nov. 7, 2017).
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program. 32 Today, the vast majority of these schemes are funded by the payroll
tax levied upon employers. 3 3
West Virginia's benefits program mirrors the schemes established in
most other states. First, a claimant files a claim with the West Virginia
Unemployment Compensation Division. 3 4 Next, the Division determines
whether the claimant is eligible under section 21A-6-1 of the West Virginia
Code.3 5 If a claimant is deemed eligible, the Division must determine whether
the claimant is disqualified under West Virginia's disqualification statute. 36 if
not, the claimant collects.
The disqualification statute provides for several situations where a
claimant cannot collect. 37 For example, a claimant who "voluntarily" leaves his
or her job is disqualified for benefits unless that claimant can show "good cause"
for departure;38 courts, however, are generally hesitant to "weigh in" on the
validity of a claimant's grievances about their prior employment. 39 A claimant
who fails to accept suitable, available work is also disqualified.4 0
2.

Principles and Policy of Labor Dispute Disqualification

The focus of this Note is the "labor dispute disqualification": a claimant
cannot collect benefits for time where the claimant was unemployed due to
participating in a labor dispute.41 Several principles form the foundation for labor
dispute disqualification.4 2 These principles do not control the outcome of
individual claims, and courts and commentators do not agree as to their
32
History of Unemployment Insurance in the United States, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/ocia/pdf/75th-anniversary-summary-final.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2017).

3
State Unemployment InsuranceBenefits, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR: EMP'T & TRAINING ADMIN.,
http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/uifactsheet.asp (last visited Oct. 7, 2017).
34
Steps to File an Initial Claim and General Information, WORKFORCE W. VA.,
http://workforcewv.org/unemployment/claimants/filing-an-initial-claim.html (last visited Nov. 7,

2017).
35
See Univ. of W. Va. Bd. of Trs. v. Aglinsky, 522 S.E.2d 909, 911 (W. Va. 1999) ("The first
step requires determining whether an individual is eligible to receive such benefits. The second
step is to consider whether the individual is disqualified.").
36

W. VA. CODE ANN.

3

Id. § 21A-6-3.
Id. § 21A-6-3(1).

38

§ 21A-6-3

(West 2017).

39
See Thomas J. Goger, Annotation, General Principles Pertaining to Statutory
Disqualificationfor Unemployment Compensation Benefits Because ofStrike or Labor Dispute,

63 A.L.R.3d 88 (1975) [hereinafter General Principles] ("[E]ligibility of a particular
claimant . . would not be affected by the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the respective
demands [underlying a labor dispute].").
40
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21A-6-3(3) (West 2017).
41
42

Id. § 21A-6-3(4).
General Principles,supra note 39.
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application.4 3 These principles should, however, color a legislature's approach
in thoughtfully drafting a disqualification statute. They certainly do come into
play when courts review disqualification schemes.44
i.

The "State Neutrality" Principle

An oft-cited principle in labor dispute qualification is that the state
should remain neutral in employer-employee relations. 4 5 After all, the
availability or unavailability of benefits can skew the power balance between the
employer and the employee in collective bargaining negotiations.4 6 Wrongfully
withheld benefits stifle an employee's ability to hold out, while liberally
available benefits might fuel disputes beyond the legislature's intent.4 7 Courts
attempt to remain neutral by refusing to weigh in on the merits of the underlying
labor dispute.48
Controversial claim resolutions can lead to charges that the state
breached its duty of neutrality. The Supreme Court of Nebraska 4 9 faced such
charges after IBP, Inc. v. Aanenson.s0 The court disqualified striking claimants
for a six week period, while the labor dispute itself lasted for roughly 19 weeks.51
The court did not disqualify for the entirety of the labor dispute because the
employer could have opened a secondary plant that would have alleviated the
effects of the work stoppage. 52 The court attributed the second half of the
unemployment period not to the labor dispute, but to the employer's failure to

43

Id.

4

See infra text accompanying notes 195-202.

45
See, e.g., Robert S. Abbott Publ'g Co. v. Annunzio, 112 N.E.2d 101, 106 (111. 1953);
Intertown Corp. v. Appeal Bd. of Mich. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 43 N.W.2d 888, 890

(Mich. 1950).
4
Pedro L. Cisneros, Unemployment Compensation and the "Stoppage of Work"
Concept - Abandoning State Neutrality by Requiring the Employer to Replace Strikers or Resume
OperationsDuringa Labor Dispute: IBP v. Aanenson, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 685, 706-07 (1991).
47
However, one commentator has suggested that a truly neutral state would never deny
benefits to a participant in a labor dispute because of unequal bargaining power between employers
and employees. Milton I. Shadur, Unemployment Benefits and the "Labor Dispute"
Disqualification,17 U. CHI. L. REv. 294, 298 (1950).
48

Cisneros, supra note 46, at 704-O5.

49
Nebraska's disqualification statute is identical to West Virginia's. Compare NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 48-638 (West 2017), with W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21A-6-3 (West 2017).

5o

452 N.W.2d 59 (Neb. 1990); Cisneros, supra note 46, at 707-08.

5'
52

Aanenson, 452 N.W.2d at 59.
Id. at 69.
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mitigate.5 3 Accordingly, the claimants collected benefits for those latter 12
weeks.54
The IBP decision placed a burden on employers to either replace striking
workers or resume normal operations within a "reasonable" amount of time-a
burden not readily apparent in Nebraska's unemployment statute. 5 One
commentator argues that the court in IBP "abandoned the state policy of
maintaining a neutral position in the labor dispute" by "[c]onsidering which party
was responsible for the work stoppage" throughout the dispute. 56
The application of the state neutrality principle is highly contentious.
Some commentators argue that any benefits available to striking employees
would inherently render the state "un-neutral" because from the employer's
perspective, those benefits, in effect, fund the dispute.57 These commentators
argue that because unemployment compensation is not a natural right, but a
creation of government, extending benefits during a labor dispute unnaturally
places the state in the middle of labor negotiations.58 A truly "neutral" state, then,
would tend to favor disqualification, to permit each side to "naturally" exert its
respective bargaining power.59
Critics of this theory argue that blanket denial of benefits is equally "unneutral" in favor of employers, as it discourages employees from utilizing their
bargaining power. 6 0 Compensation is generally afforded to those who have
voluntarily left employment for good cause or due to unsuitable working
conditions.61 Workers engaged in a strike are voluntarily unemployed as a means
to affect working conditions; 62 a "neutral" state would stand by its policy of
subsidizing voluntary unemployment for good cause. 6 3
Although commentators have questioned both the application and the
importance of the state neutrality principle, courts will routinely implicitly or

5

Id.

54

Id. at 70.

5

Cisneros, supra note 46, at 712.
Id. at 707-08.

56

5
58

See, e.g., PAUL H. DOUGLAS, STANDARDS OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 59-61 (1933).
See id.

See id.
Leonard Lesser, Labor Disputes and Unemployment Compensation,55 YALE L. J. 167, 17475 (1945).
61
Id. at 174.
59
6

See Shadur, supra note 47, at 299 ("Even to the extent that actual financing [of strikes] may
sometimes take place . . . some strikes deserve to be financed as attempts . .. to protect positive
rights given employees by other legislation or by contract.").
63
Lesser, supra note 60, at 174-75.
62
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explicitly remind the parties that the state will remain neutral as to the merits of
the underlying dispute. 6 4
ii.

The HumanitarianAims of CompensationSchemes
Should Be Consideredwhen Interpreting
DisqualificationStatutes

Courts also stress that unemployment compensation schemes should be
liberally construed to achieve the statutes' purposes of promoting public health
and general welfare.65 Every unemployment compensation scheme has a
legislative statement of purpose that claim these general interests. West
Virginia's statement of purpose reads as follows:
[T]he legislature establishes a compulsory system of
unemployment reserves in order to: (1) Provide a measure of
security to the families of unemployed persons[;] (2) Guard
against the menace to health, morals and welfare arising from
unemployment[;] (3) Maintain as great purchasing power as
possible, with a view to sustaining the economic system during
periods of economic depression[;] (4) Stimulate stability of
employment as a requisite of social and economic security[;] (5)
Allay and Rrevent the debilitating consequences of poor relief
assistance.
Courts cite the "humanitarian" aims of unemployment compensation to
liberally construe unemployment compensation statutes. 67 Courts will also
narrowly construe disqualification provisions to maximize the humanitarian
legislative purpose.68
However, weighing a legislature's dedication to welfare too heavily
might fluster the legislative purpose behind enacting a disqualification statutealthough states have enacted benefits programs with humanitarian goals, these
states have also enacted disqualification statutes that deny access to these

6

See Shadur, supra note 47, at 296-97.
[T]he rationale of state neutrality has been subjected to [a] dual attack: on its
theoretical legitimacy and on its proper application to the problem of
unemployment benefits. But once again, the attacks cannot obscure the fact
that the rationale is present and must be dealt with in evaluating the acts and

decisions under them.
Id. at 298.
65
Davis v. Hix, 84 S.E.2d 404, 417 (W. Va. 1954).
66
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21A-1-1 (West 2017).
67
Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Epling, 739 S.E.2d 290, 295 (W. Va. 2013).
68

Herbert J. Thomas Mem'l Hosp. v. Bd. of Review of the W. Va. Bureau of Emp't Programs,

620 S.E.2d 169, 172 (W. Va. 2005).
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humanitarian funds. 6 9 The Appellate Court of Indiana agreed that unemployment
compensation schemes "should be liberally construed to give effect to its
beneficent, humane and sound economic policy" but that "this liberality does not
permit the giving of its benefits to those whom the legislature has positively
determined should not have such benefits." 70
iii.

Claimants Who "Voluntarily" Leave Employment
Should Not Be Entitled to Compensation

Unemployment compensation is an insurance program designed to
provide a measure of security for those who become involuntarily unemployed
through no fault of their own.7 1 The system was not designed to compensate
individuals who "willfully contribute[] to the cause of their own
unemployment." 7 2 Although labor dispute disqualification statutes do not
explicitly mention the "voluntariness" of a claimant's unemployment, courts
often take it into account.7 3
The "voluntariness of unemployment" theory can be dangerous when
applied to claimants involved in a labor dispute.74 Judge Milton Shadur noted
that "many courts have devoted more time to explaining why claimants'
unemployment was 'voluntary' so as to impose disqualification than to applying
the actual terms of the labor-dispute provision itself." 75 This Section will now
turn to the actual terms of various labor dispute disqualification provisions.
B.

Labor Dispute DisqualificationStatutes

All states have a labor dispute disqualification statute.7 6 This Section
will look at similarities and differences in statutory language across the country.
It will then give special attention to the story of labor dispute disqualification in
West Virginia by looking at the old statute and the changes made by the state
legislature in April of 2017.

69

70

Blakely v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 90 N.E.2d 353, 356 (Ind. Ct. App. 1950).
Id. at 357.

See Childress v. Muzzle, 663 S.E.2d 583, 587 (W. Va. 2008); Shadur, supra note 47, at 301.
Hill v. Bd. of Review, 276 S.E.2d 805, 807 (W. Va. 1981) (quoting Bd. of Review v. Hix,
29 S.E.2d 618, 619 (W. Va. 1944)).
n
Shadur, supra note 47, at 296 ("[T]he doctrine that the right to benefits should be gauged
by the 'involuntary' nature of unemployment must be recognized as the most influential theory in
[mid-20th century] case law.").
71

72

74

Id.

Id.
See Jerre S. Williams, The Labor Dispute Disqualification-A Primerand Some Problems,
8 VAND. L. REv. 338, 338-39 (1955).
75

76
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The State of Labor Dispute Disqualification Across the Country

The Social Security Act of 1935 gave states a great incentive to quickly
implement unemployment compensation schemes. 7 Two general approaches
emerged: "labor dispute in active progress" disqualification, and "stoppage of
work" disqualification.7 8 This Section will look at each approach. But first, it
will turn to the common provisions that can be found in many disqualification
statutes across the country.
i.

Common Provisions

Several default provisions are utilized across the country. One such
default provision is an "escape clause." This provision acknowledges that some
claimants might find themselves unemployed after a labor dispute without ever
participating in it. 7 9 The provision, then, permits labor dispute nonparticipants to
"escape" disqualification. The Social Security Board's Draft Bill of 1935
provides a nice example of an "escape clause":
[A claimant is not disqualified] if it is shown to the satisfaction
of the commissioner that-(1) He is not participating in, or
financing, or directly interested in the labor dispute which
caused the stoppage of work; and (2) He does not belong to a
grade or class or workers of which, immediately before the
commencement of the stoppage there were members employed
at the premises at which the stoppage or occurs, any of whom
are participatig in or financing or directly interested in the
dispute[.]8
The United States Department of Labor explains that this provision is "so drafted
as ... to protect other workers from loss of benefits due to a strike that affects
their work indirectly." 8 1
Another provision commonly found in labor dispute disqualification
statutes is the "employer fault" provision. This provision immunizes claimants
who, during a labor dispute, find themselves unemployed by "fault" of their
employer. 8 2 West Virginia's old statute contains a nice example:

n
Willard A. Lewis, The Statutory Language of Labor Dispute Disqualification in State
Employment Security Laws, 82 POL. SCI. Q. 72, 74 (Mar. 1967).
78

Id.

79
80

Id. at 77.
Id. at 75.

81

Id. at 80 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF EMP'T SEC., MANUAL OF STATE

EMPLOYMENT SECURITY LEGISLATION 504-05 (1940)).
82

Id.
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[Claimants are not disqualified if] the employees are required to
accept wages, hours or conditions of employment substantially
less favorable than those prevailing for similar work in the
locality, or if employees are denied the right of collective
bargaining under generally prevailing conditions, or if an
employer shuts down his or her plant or operation or dismisses
his or her employees in order to force wage reduction, changes
in hours or working conditions. 83
An "employer fault" provision is a narrow departure from the state neutrality
principle; a state will consider the merits of the dispute if the employer satisfies
these criteria. 84 The most common example is in case of a lockout: a claimant
who attempts to work but is turned away by his or her employer is not
disqualified from benefits. 85
ii.

The Main Divergence: "In Active Progress" vs.
"Stoppage of Work"

While many states share these default provisions, the main divergence
in state schemes is the meat-and-bones of the disqualification test.86 "In active
progress" and "stoppage of work" statutes present different inquiries that
naturally lead to different results. This Section will examine each brand of
statute, explain West Virginia's old law, and review the changes the legislature
made in 2017.
a.

"In Active Progress"

Fifteen states and the District of Columbia have "in active progress"
disqualification statutes.87 Oregon's law provides a clear example:
An individual is disqualified for benefits for any week with
respect to which ... the unemployment of the individual is due
to a labor dispute that is in active progress at the factory,
establishment or other premises at which the individual is or was
last employed or at which the individual claims employment
rights by union agreement or otherwise. 88

83

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21A-6-3(4) (West 2016) (amended 2017).

84

Lewis, supra note 77, at 78.

85

Id. at 84.

86

Id. at 74.

8
James K. Bradley & Daniel R. Schuckers, Toward a Unified Theory of Unemployment
CompensationEligibilityfor Replaced Striking Employees, 61 U. PiTT. L. REV. 499, 505 (2000).
88
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 657.200 (West 2017).
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In an "in active progress" state, an unemployment compensation
board-or a reviewing court-must determine: (1) whether a labor dispute
occurred, (2) whether the labor dispute caused the claimant's unemployment, and
(3) whether the dispute was in active progress for the time in question. 89 If, say,
a claimant remains unemployed after a labor dispute is resolved, that claimant is
not disqualified for that post-dispute unemployment. 90 Of course, many "in
active progress" states have "escape clauses" 91 or "employer fault provisions" 92
which add further nuance to this straightforward framework.
In 1940, the Federal Social Security Administration announced its
disfavor of "in active progress" statutes.
The "dispute in active progress" concept . .. is so difficult of
precise determination that it would seem to necessitate an
arbitrary limit on the duration of the disqualification so that the
agency would not be faced with the problem of determining
whether a dispute is still "in active progress" several weeks or
months after it begins. Such a limit has serious implications in
the event of a prolonged strike involving a large number of
workers. The "stoppage [of work] concept", on the other hand,
is more susceptible to determination by objective standards. 9
Sixteen jurisdictions use an "in active progress" statute. 94
b.

"Stoppage of Work"

"Stoppage of work" statutes are highly litigated. First, this Section will
introduce the "stoppage of work" issue. Next, this Section will survey how states
differ on the scope of the inquiry, which can have far-reaching effects on
respective outcomes. Finally, this Section will look more specifically at the
workings of West Virginia's old "stoppage of work" statute before the 2017
amendment.

89

See Bradley & Schuckers, supra note 87, at 505.

90

Foy Martin Sheet Metal v. Emp't. Div., 713 P.2d 662, 664 (Or. Ct. App. 1986).

9

See Lewis, supra note 77, at 77.

92

Id. at 83-84.

9

Id. at 81 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF EMP'T SEC., MANUAL OF STATE

EMPLOYMENT SECURITY LEGISLATION 505 (1940)).

94

See Shadur, supra note 47, at 317.
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A majority of states, including West Virginia up until the 2017
legislative session, followed the "stoppage of work" model. 95 These statutes
borrow heavily from the Social Security Board Draft bill noted earlier. 96
An individual shall be disqualified for benefits ...
[fjor any
week with respect to which the commissioner finds that his total
or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which
exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or
97
other premises at which he is or was last employed[.]

'

Thus, a prerequisite to disqualification is that the employer suffered a
"stoppage of work."9 8 If an employer cannot show that it suffered a "stoppage of
work" in connection to the labor dispute, the inquiry ends there-the claimant
can collect, regardless of the claimant's participation in a strike. 99 Most states,
including West Virginia under the old statute, define a "stoppage of work" as a
"substantial curtailment" of the employer's operations. 00 Administrative law
judges will review evidence of a company's operations before, during, and after
the labor dispute to determine whether the employer's operations suffered a
"substantial curtailment."' 0
The draft bill and many state laws' 0 2 require the employer to show a
stoppage of work at the "factory, establishment, or other premises at which [the
claimant] was last employed." 0 3 Some courts read "establishment" broadly.1 04
In these jurisdictions, the employer must show that company-wide operations
suffered a work stoppage due to the strike in question. 105 Other courts find that
an "establishment" is a distinct physical location. Employers in these

95

See infra Sections II.B.2.b-d (discussing judicial approaches of states sharing West

Virginia's labor dispute disqualification language).
96

Soc. SEC. BD., DRAFT BILLS FOR STATE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION OF POOLED FUNDS

AND EMPLOYER RESERVE ACCOUNT TYPES 11-15 (1936) [hereinafter DRAFT BILLS].

97
98

Id. at 13.
See generally Thomas J. Goger, Annotation, Construction of Phrase "Establishment" or
"Factory, Establishment, or Other Premises" Within Unemployment Compensation Statute
RenderingEmployee IneligibleDuring Labor Dispute or Strike at Such Location, 60 A.L.R.3d 11,
§ 3 (1974) [hereinafter Construction of Unemployment Statutes].
99
See Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Bd. of Review of Workforce W. Va., No. 12-1106, 2013 WL

5967047, at *5 (W. Va. Nov. 8, 2013) (permitting the dispersal of benefits where Verizon suffered
no stoppage of work, even though claimants were undisputedly "on strike").
'

t
102

76 AM. JUR. 2d Unemployment Compensation § 181.
See, e.g., Verizon, 2013 WL 5967047, at *5.

103

Construction of Unemployment Statutes, supra note 98, Part II § 3.
DRAFT BILLS, supra note 96, at 13.

104

See Constructionof Unemployment Statutes, supra note 98, Part II § 4(a)b).

05

Id.
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jurisdictions need only show that a particular worksite suffered a stoppage of
work.1 06

Several states have adopted a factor-based inquiry to determine the scope
of an "establishment" under their disqualification statutes. 07 This approach reads
"establishment" to mean an "order or system" unrelated to physical location.'0 8
If a disqualification statute is read with this definition in mind, a claimant is only
disqualified if an employer can show that a unit of work suffered a work
stoppage.1 09 The Supreme Court of Minnesota in Nordling v. FordMotor Co. 110
explained:
We believe that the solution of the problem lies in determining
from all the facts availablewhether the unit under consideration
is a separate establishment from the standpoint of employment
and not whether it is a single enterprise from the standpoint of
management or for the more efficient production of goods."'
Factor-test states generally agree on which factors should be utilized,
although there is some variance in application of those factors. 1 2 The Appellate
Court of Indiana has summarized those factors:
Factors to be taken into consideration may include the functional
integration of the corporation's plants, the general unity of the
plants as a whole, [] the physical proximity of one plant to other
plants, . . . the hiring and firing of employees, the relationships
between local unions and national unions, and the local
agreements, including wages, seniority rights, etc." 3
"Functional integration" and "general unity" lie at the heart of the term
"establishment" for courts following this approach. In Ford Motor Co. v.
Abercrombie,1 4 the Supreme Court of Georgia found that an assembly factory
in Georgia and a parts-producing plant in Michigan were within the same
establishment." 5 The court noted that "each depend[ed] on the other for the

106

107
10

See, e.g., Ahnne v. Dep't of Labor & Indus. Relations, 489 P.2d 1397, 1397 (Haw. 1971).
Construction of Unemployment Statutes, supra note 98, Part III § 8(a).
Establishment, DICTIONARY.COM,

http://www.dictionary.com/browse/establishment?s-t

(last visited Nov. 7, 2017).
109
Nordling v. Ford Motor Co., 42 N.W.2d 576, 588 (Minn. 1950) (emphasis added).
110

42 N.W.2d 576 (Minn. 1950).

II

Id. at 588 (emphasis added).

112

Ahnne v. Dep't of Labor & Indus. Relations, 489 P.2d 1397, 1401 (Haw. 1971).

113

Gen. Motors Corp. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 255 N.E.2d 107, 113 (Ind. App.

1970) (citing Nordling, 42 N.W.2d at 586).
114
62 S.E.2d 209 (Ga. 1950).
115s

Id. at 212.
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functions assigned to it in order to complete the manufacturing processes
essential to making Ford automobiles."ll 6 Because the assembly plant and partsproducing plant were both "inseparable and indispensable" to Ford's operations,
the workplaces were "parts of one and the same 'factory, establishment, or other
premises' as contemplated [by the disqualification statute]." 117
Other jurisdictions have confined the "stoppage of work" inquiry to
distinct workplaces by interpreting "establishment" to refer to a specific,
physical location. 8 Under this test, an employer need only show that a
"stoppage of work" occurred at the claimant's most recent workplace.1 9 The
Supreme Court of Illinois paved the way for this interpretation in Walgreen Co.
v. Murphy.12 0 The case arose from a labor dispute at a Walgreens warehouse
when 320 employees participated in a strike that lasted approximately three
weeks. 12 1 The court concluded that "without question" there was a stoppage of
work at that particular Walgreens warehouse; 12 2 the case turned on whether the
warehouse was an "establishment" under Illinois's disqualification statute. 123
The claimants argued that "the warehouse [was] only one integrated unit of the
chain store of the Walgreen Company," 2 4 and because "there [was] no evidence
to indicate that the total business of the Company was appreciably affected by
the labor dispute at the warehouse," the Walgreen Company suffered no stoppage
of work. 125 This argument relied on the premise that the term "establishment"
could be construed to encompass a corporation's multi-plant operations. 126
The Supreme Court of Illinois flatly rejected the claimant's argument,
finding that "[t]he words 'establishment' and 'premises,' employed in [the
disqualification statute] are so commonly understood as units of place that further
definition is superfluous."1 2 7 The court relied on the plain meaning of the term
"establishment" to find that "[c]omplete geographic isolation. . . is sufficient to
justify classification of the warehouse as an establishment." 28 Because the court

116

Id. at 214.

117

Id. at 215.
Construction of Unemployment Statutes, supra note 98, Part 11 § 4(a).
Id at Part II § 5.

118
119
120

53 N.E.2d 390 (111. 1944).

121

Id. at 392.

122

Id. at 393.

123

Id. at 394.

124

Id.

125

Id.

126

See generally id.

127

Id.

128

Id.
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found that, "without question," there was a stoppage of work at the Walgreens
warehouse, the claimants were disqualified from benefits.129
Walgreen adopts what might be called the "distinct physical workplace"
approach. Other state courts have used similar language to reach the same
conclusion. The Court of Appeals of New York has equated "establishment" with
"place or situs." 1 3 0 The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii has explained that
the term establishment "refer[s] to a building or group of proximate buildings,
31
but, generally speaking, it should not refer to locations many miles apart."1
Functionally, these cases stand for the same proposition: that "establishment"
refers to a distinct physical workplace, and not a system of a company's
operations.
The "establishment" question is perhaps the biggest legal ambiguity in a
"stoppage of work" statute. In some states, an employer must show that a labor
dispute caused a stoppage of work among functionally integrated units of work;
in other states, only a stoppage of work at a distinct physical workplace is
required to disqualify striking claimants. It is an ambiguity that has yielded a
wide range of results.
2.

West Virginia's Unemployment Compensation Scheme

The West Virginia Legislature enacted its unemployment compensation
scheme, along with a labor dispute disqualification, in 1936.132 The Legislature
borrowed heavily from the Social Security Draft Bill, opting to adopt the
"stoppage of work" approach. This Section will detail West Virginia's
experience with the "stoppage of work" statute before addressing the amendment
made in April of 2017.
i.

The "Stoppage of Work" Statute

&

For 81 years, West Virginia was a "stoppage of work" state.' 33 The
establishment issue discussed in the previous section never made it before the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. The court did have several
occasions to address the old statute, however.' 34 The court in Cumberland

129

Id.

130

In re Claim of Ferrara, 176 N.E.2d 43, 46 (N.Y. 1961).

131
132

Ahnne v. Dep't of Labor & Indus. Relations, 489 P.2d 1397, 1401 (Haw. 1971).

133

See Miners in Gen. Grp. v. Hix, 123 W. Va. 637, 637 (1939).
See S.B. 222, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2017).

134

Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Bd. of Review of Workforce W. Va., No. 12-1106, 2013 WL

5967047, at *1 (W. Va. Nov. 8, 2013) (memorandum opinion affirming the factual determinations
of the ALJ); Smittle v. Gatson, 465 S.E.2d 873, 877 (W. Va. 1995) (exempting claimants from
disqualification because the employer initiated a shutdown); Ash v. Rutledge, 348 S.E.2d 442,
446-47 (W. Va. 1986) (allowing claimants to collect benefits because they did not participate in
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Allegheny Gas Co. v. Hatcherl35 articulated the general standard for determining
the existence of a stoppage of work.1 3 6
The Cumberland case arose out of a labor dispute between a gas
company and a local union.137 Negotiations between the two for a new collective
bargaining agreement slowed to a standstill in the mid-summer months of
1960. 138 Fearing a strike during the winter months, when the company's heating
services would be needed the most, the company imposed a lockout on July 29,
1960.139 During the lockout, the company requested 17 workers to "perform
emergency work," an offer the union and the individual claimants declined.' 40
All 79 of the company's hourly workers ceased to work, picketing peacefully
until the dispute was resolved on August 26, 1960.141 The majority opinion in
Cumberlandexplained the company's operations during the lockout:
No new employees were hired by the gas company to perform
[any] of their duties, but emergency or essential duties normally
performed by the claimants were performed by seventeen
supervisory and promotional employees of the company.
According to the testimony of the gas company's district office
manager ... the company's overall operations were curtailed by
approximately eighty per cent and work in thirteen necessary
and essential categories of the gas company's business and
operations either ceased entirely or was performed on an
emergency and partial basis.1 4 2
The claimant's collection hinged on whether a "stoppage of work"
occurred at the "factory, establishment or other premises" at which the claimant

the labor dispute); Lee-Norse Co. v. Rutledge, 291 S.E.2d 477, 482-83 (W. Va. 1982) (finding that
the expiration of a collective bargaining contract does not qualify as a "dispute" under the statute);

Hill v. Bd. of Review, 276 S.E.2d 805, 811-12 (W. Va. 1981) (finding that a work stoppage that
occurs because of an independent event unrelated to the labor dispute would not disqualify a

claimant); Copen v. Hix, 43 S.E.2d 382, 387 (W. Va. 1947) (disqualifying claimants who financed
the dispute).

130 S.E.2d 115 (W. Va. 1963).

'
136

Id. at 118.

136

Id. at 119-20.

137

Id. at 118.
Id. It is worth noting that the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement can no longer
be the basis for a "labor dispute." Lee Norse, 291 S.E.2d at 484 (overruling Cumberland, 130
138

S.E.2d 115, on these grounds).
139

Cumberland, 130 S.E.2d at 118.

140

Id.

141

Id.

142

Id. at 118-19.
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last worked.1 43 The Department of Employment Security Board of Review and
the Circuit Court of Kanawha County both found that there had not been a
stoppage of work.1 4 4 Accordingly, section 21A-6-3 of the West Virginia Code
did not disqualify the claimants from collection.1 4 5 The Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia agreed,1 4 6 and in doing so, articulated the approach
that lower courts in West Virginia followed until the recent amendment to the
statute. 147
The court held that "stoppage of work .. . refer[s] to the employer's plant
operations rather than to the employees' labor." 48 A stoppage of work "cannot
be determined solely on the basis of the proportionate number of employees
affected."149 A stoppage of work could stem from a strike "affecting relatively
few

employees"; 150

on the other

hand, a labor dispute involving

"a

proportionately greater number of employees" does not necessarily imply a
stoppage.' 5 ' Instead, triers of fact will hear evidence regarding the employer's
production, revenue, and overall business operations to determine the stoppage

of work issue.1 5 2 States with statutes similar to West Virginia's disqualification
statute also hold this principle. 13
The specific test adopted by the court required a "substantial curtailment

of work or operations" for the section 21A-6-3(3) disqualification to apply.1 5 4
Applied to the facts in Cumberland, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia concluded that there was no stoppage of work because "there was no

substantial showing of unfulfilled [gas] demands," and there was no "showing of
an accumulated backlog of work ... to require employment of additional
personnel or to require overtime."'is5 Because the court found no stoppage of

work, section 21A-6-3(3)
unemployment benefits.' 6
After the

did not disqualify claimants from collecting

Cumberland decision in 1963, there was hardly any

development of the "stoppage of work" issue in West Virginia. While other

143

Id. at 119.

14

Id. at 115.

145

147

Id. at 117.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 120-23.

148

Id. at 120.

149

152

Id. at 121.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.

1

76 AM. JUR. 2d Unemployment Compensation § 181.

154

Cumberland, 130 S.E.2d at 121.

155

Id.
Id. at 123.

146

150
151

156
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'

courts have found occasion to interpret state disqualification statutes and develop
judicial rules, 157 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia deferred greatly
to the administrative adjudication process,' 5 8 evidenced by the fact that West
Virginia courts will only reverse Board of Review factual findings that are
"clearly wrong."' 59 Although questions of law warrant de novo review,1 60 West
Virginia courts have not embraced many legal questions arising from the
disqualification statute. The "stoppage of work" issue "requires complex factual
determinations . . made without any statutory guidelines" and often results in
allegedly "arbitrary decisions."' 6
A reliance on standard-less administrative fact finding might be best
evidenced in the Supreme Court of Appeals's memorandum opinion in Verizon
Services Corp. v. Board ofReview of Workforce West Virginia.162 In Verizon, the

court used the "substantial deference" standard to affirm an administrative
finding that the claimants were not disqualified.1 63 The claimants worked at a
call center that handled customer service matters.' 64 During the strike, the call
center diverted customer service calls to a different location and used the retained
employees to handle sales calls, which required fewer man-hours.' 6 5 The call
center saw a significant drop in services provided during the strike, but the Board
of Review permitted benefits because Verizon's customer service hotline
remained on-line, thanks to the other call centers that picked up the slack.1 6 6
Because the stoppage of work question is presented as entirely a question of fact,
the court relied heavily upon the Board's findings-which Justice Allen H.
Loughry II called "patently unfair" in his dissent. 67
ii.

West Virginia's New Statute

Perhaps noting the shortcomings of the "stoppage of work" inquiry, the
West Virginia Legislature passed an amendment to the labor dispute

15

See supra Part 11.

15

Syl. Pt. 3, Adkins v. Gatson, 453 S.E.2d 395, 397 (1994).

5

Id.

o60 Id. ("If the question on review is one purely of law, no deference is given and the standard
ofjudicial review by the court is de novo.").
161
Ken Matheny, Labor Dispute Disqualificationfor Unemployment Compensation Benefits,

95 W. VA. L. REv. 791, 797 (1993).
162

Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Bd. of Review of Workforce W. Va., No. 12-1106, 2013 WL

5967047, at *3-5 (W. Va. Nov. 8, 2013).
163

Id. at *3.

1
165

Id. at*1.

166

Id.

67

Id. at *6 (Loughry, J., dissenting).

Id.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol120/iss2/9

20

Lorensen: Abandoning the Stoppage of Work Inquiry: Why Other States Should

Abandoning the Stoppage of Work Inquiry

2017]

649

disqualification statute in April of 2017.168 The statute disqualifies any claimant
"[fjor any week or portion thereof in which he or she did not work as a result
of ... [a] strike or other bona fide labor dispute which caused him or her to leave
or lose his or her employment."' 69 The new test is unique. The statute also
contains two "employer fault" provisions that deserve some attention.
a.

The "Lockout" Provision

b.

The "Permanent Replacement" Provision

-

The new statute makes a distinction between unemployment stemming
from a strike and unemployment stemming from a lockout. While employees on
strike are disqualified, locked out employees are not-so long as the claimant
can show that he or she showed up for work and was turned away by the
employer.1 70 Interestingly, the statute as originally proposed required a locked
out employee to "identif[y] that he or she was reporting for and prepared to
work."' 7 ' This language was stricken in the House.1 7 2

Striking claimants are entitled to benefits "[i]f the operation of the
facility is with workers hired to permanently replace the employees on strike."' 7 3
However, employers may utilize the services of "non-striking employees of the
company" or "contractors" to maintain operations without entitling striking
employees to benefits. 174 Accordingly, the question of disqualification lies on
whether the "scab" used to keep the facility running is temporary or permanent.
A striking claimant is deemed permanently replaced if the new employee is
notified they are a permanent replacement. 175 The statute suggests that temporary
labor dispute, or a shorter
replacements work "for the duration of [the] ...
period."176
III. ANALYSIS

Having surveyed the national landscape and detailed West Virginia
statutory development, this Note will turn to its main argument. This Part will

168

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21A-6-3 (West 2017).

169
170

Id. § 21A-6-3(4).
Id. § 21A-6-3(4)(b)-(c).

171

See S.B. 222, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2017).

172

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21A-6-3 (West 2017).

173

Id. § 21A-6-3(4)(b).

174

75

Id.
Id. § 21A-6-3(4)(d).

76

Id.
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show that the "stoppage of work" inquiry is unwieldy and difficult to apply. It
will then explain why West Virginia's amendment is an admirable replacement
that creates a more easily justiciable standard, while preserving the important
aspects of the "stoppage of work" test that protected claimants. This Part will
conclude by pointing to a few problematic aspects of the new statute, and by
explaining how aggrieved claimants might argue around these statutory
roadblocks before a circuit court or the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia.
A.

West Virginia Is Better Off Without the "Stoppage of Work" Test

The "stoppage of work" test has theoretical and practical shortcomings.
On a theoretical level, the "stoppage of work" test is a poor metric of identifying
the existence of a labor dispute. In 1940, the Federal Social Security
Administration claimed the "stoppage of work" test provided "objective
standards" to use in determining the length of a labor dispute. 77 Verizon Services
v. Board ofReview 17 8 provides an excellent case study as to why an employer's
operations are a poor indicator of the seriousness of a labor dispute.
In Verizon, the effected call center shifted its operational focus during a
labor dispute.' 7 9 Before the strike, the center handled phone calls from customers
seeking to cancel a subscription.' 80 But after 70 employees went on strike in
2013, the center began operating as a sales and service center.'' When Verizon
challenged the claim, the Board had to determine whether the call center suffered
a "substantial curtailment of operations"' 8 2 -an impossible task, considering
operations were of a different character before and during the strike.
Justice Loughry's dissent in Verizon highlights several shortcomings of
the "stoppage of work" inquiry in practice.' 83 The "stoppage of work" question
placed the burden on the employer to collect operational data during the labor
dispute and to furnish that proof to the Board.1 84 The Board was then free to
discredit that operational data if the employer deviated from its data collection
protocol during the labor dispute.' 85 Justice Loughry called it "patently unfair"
to expect employers to maintain data collection protocol during a dispute where

in

Lewis, supra note 77, at 80 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF EMP'T SEC., MANUAL

505 (1940)).
2013 WL 5967047 (W. Va. Nov. 8, 2013).
Id. at *1.

OF STATE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY LEGISLATION

17
179

80

i8
182

Id.
Id.

183

Id. at *2-4.
Id. at *5 (Loughry, J., dissenting).

184

Id.

185

Id. at *6.
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much of their labor force was depleted.1 86 After all, the employees typically
tasked with tracking operational data may well be unavailable.
A state-by-state comparison of "stoppage of work" statutes shows that
the test fails to produce predictable results. Courts have split on the scope on the
inquiry, leading to wildly different results stemming from nearly identical
language deriving from the same draft bill. Finally, the Board resolves these
compensation claims without any meaningful review from courts. The Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia will reverse a factual determination only in
cases of "substantial deference."' 8 ' The result is an Unemployment Board (1)
with very few legal principles constraining its "stoppage of work" inquiry which
(2) is afforded a high level of deference.
The "stoppage of work" test is not well-calibrated to determine the
seriousness of a labor dispute. Nor is the language easily interpreted or
consistently applied. The state is better off without it.
B.

West Virginia'sNew Statute Is an Admirable, ifImperfect,
Replacement

The new West Virginia statute removes the "stoppage of work" test
entirely. The amendment adds much needed clarity and predictability to a
contentious area of law. Undoubtedly, the amendment will result in more
claimant disqualifications, but the "employer fault" provisions keep
much-needed protections for claimants who are locked out and/or permanently
replaced by their employer. The state judiciary's treatment of these "employer
fault" provisions may well determine the success of the new amendment.
This Section will show why the new test will lead to clear and predictable
results. Next, it will explain three shortcomings of the statute and how claimants
who find themselves aggrieved by these obstacles can overcome them.
1.

The New Statute Provides Much-Needed Clarity and Predictability

The new West Virginia statute is far easier to apply, and far more
predictable, than "stoppage of work" statutes. The Unemployment Services
Office judges need not review company operations to determine whether
curtailment of operations was "substantial" enough to rise to the level of a
stoppage. Instead, the judge must first determine whether a "strike or other bona
fide labor dispute ... caused [the claimant] to leave or lose his or her
employment"; 188 second, whether the employer locked out or permanently
replaced the claimant.' 8 9
I86

Id.

18

Id. at *3 (majority opinion).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21 A-6-3(4)(a) (West 2017).
Id. § 21A-6-3(4)(b)-(d).

188

189
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A clear and predictable answer follows. Predictability is of critical
importance for both employers and potential claimants: employers hope to
control their insurance rates, and a claimant's health and welfare might depend
on the question of disqualification. The stoppage of work question fails to yield
predictable results; this amendment gives clarity to both employers and
employees.
Undoubtedly, removing the "stoppage of work" test will lead to more
disqualifications. The claimants in Verizon Services, for instance, would not be
able to collect under the new statute. But the statute does contain two "employer
fault" provisions protecting claimants: locked out or permanently replaced
claimants remain eligible for benefits. Those two "employer fault" provisions
give important protections to claimants-and these protections are well-defined
to give clear instructions to the Unemployment Services Office. However, clarity
comes at a price.
2.

Three Shortcomings of the Current Statute

With such a bright-line disqualification test, the exceptions take on new
importance. In the labor dispute disqualification context, "escape clauses" and
"employer fault" provisions are the clearest paths for some claimants to avoid
disqualification. The new statute has two "employer fault" provisions which
could be circumvented by clever employers. The amendment also removed an
"escape clause"-a development which could prejudice some claimants. This
Section will explain these obstacles and offer an argument for claimants
aggrieved by any of these shortcomings.
The "Lockout" Provision Could Be Easily
Circumvented by Clever Employers
The first "employer fault" provision protects claimants who are
unemployed because of a lockout. A claimant is "locked out" (and, therefore, not
disqualified from collecting) when (1) the claimant "present[s] himself or herself
physically for work at the workplace," and (2) "the employer denie[s] the
individual the opportunity to ... work."19 0
An employer could easily use these conditions to its advantagemaliciously, or even by chance. Imagine an employer sending an email notifying
employees of a lockout. These employees, knowing they will be turned away if
they commute to work, do not "present [themselves] physically for work at the
workplace" the next day. 191 Perhaps the employees demonstrate outside the
employer's facility, but the employer never outright "denie[s] the [employees]

19

Id.

191

Id.

§ 21A-6-3(4)(c).
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the opportunity to . . work" at the site.192 Those hypotheticals do not fit the
narrow terms of the "employer fault" provision; by a strict reading of the statute,
those claimants are disqualified.
ii.

"PermanentlyReplaced" ClaimantsHave a Difficult
EvidentiaryBurden

The second "employer fault" provision protects claimants who are
permanently replaced during a strike. The "permanently replaced" provision is
similarly rigid. It reads as follows:
[A]n individual is determined to be permanently replaced where
the individual employee establishes that . .. the position of the

employee has been occupied by another employee who has been
notified they are permanently replacing the employee who
previously occupied the position. Employees or contractors who
are hired to perform striking employees' work on a temporary
basis, such as the duration of a strike or other bona fide labor
dispute, or shorter period of time, may not be determined to have
permanently replaced a striking employee.' 93
The Author could not find any parallel language in other disqualification
statutes. The language places the burden of proof on the claimant to show that
the employer "notified [the new employee] they are permanently replacing the
[claimant]." 1 94 Therefore, a claimant must present evidence of a communication
between an employer and an employee. By necessity, this commumication occurs
while the claimant is out of work due to a labor dispute. Strictly read, this test
might be a significant burden on the claimant.
iii.

Claimants Uninvolved in the Labor Dispute Are Still
Disqualified

The old "stoppage of work" statute contained an escape clause that
excused claimants who were "not participating in, or financing, or directly
interested in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work."l95 The new
statute offers no such protection. A strict application of our current statute would
flatly disqualify any claimant who lost or left his or her employment because of
a labor dispute, regardless of the claimant's participation. This raises a significant
fairness concern. However, as we will see in the next Section, the judiciary might
not apply the statute so strictly.
192

Id.

193

Id. § 21A-6-3(4)(d).

194

Id.

1

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21 A-6-3(4) (West 2016) (amended 2017).
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Using Lee-Norse Co. v. Rutledge:' 96 A Claimant's Argument

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia's reasoning in LeeNorse Co. v. Rutledgel 97 suggests the court might not allow employers such an
easy run-around of the spirit of the statute.'19 In that case, the employer instituted
a pre-emptive lockout before a collective bargaining agreement expired.1 99 The
court concluded that the statute "was not intended to disqualify workers who
were locked out during contract negotiations if they were willing to work on a
day-to-day basis." 2 00 A unanimous court relied heavily on the aforementioned
principles of labor dispute disqualification: "unemployment compensation
statutes . . . [are] liberally construed towards their humanitarian aims," 20 1 and
compensation should be afforded to those who are involuntarily unemployed.202
Claimants should cite the "legislative policy" and "involuntary
unemployment" principles if an employer attempts to run around these
"employer fault" provisions. Lee-Norse indicates the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia may be receptive to such an argument.
IV. CONCLUSION

The "stoppage of work" inquiry has long dominated the labor dispute
disqualification conversation across the country. The area is ripe for litigation.
Courts are divided on an issue of statutory construction that dramatically affects
the availability of benefits. Meanwhile, the ultimate factual determinationwhether an employer suffered a substantial curtailment of operations-requires
heavy discovery, and is left to a finder of fact at the administrative level.
The West Virginia Legislature correctly questioned whether a "stoppage
of work" inquiry is a workable test-or even an intuitive one. By replacing it,
employers and claimants alike will see more predictable results. West Virginia's
new statute is certainly a step in the right direction.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia will likely have reason
to interpret the new statute in the near future. In light of the black and white test
drawn by the legislature, it is possible the court uses Lee Norse and the

196
197

291 S.E.2d 477 (W. Va. 1982).
Id. at 481-84. Of course, this case predates our current iteration of the statute, but the

principles utilized by the court would likely translate to the current statute.
198
Nothing in this case suggests the employer acted in bad faith or attempted to run around the
statute. However, the principles announced by the court might be useful to a claimant who finds
him or herself in that situation.
199
Lee Norse Co., 291 S.E.2d at 478.
200

Id.

201

Id. at 482.

202

Id.
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humanitarian aims of unemployment compensation to afford claimants some
relief in the form of expanding the applicability of the statute's exceptions.
Other "stoppage of work" states should consider an amendment like
West Virginia's. "Stoppage of work" states have for decades remained with the
statute encouraged by the Social Security Administration in 1940. Perhaps the
issue is ripe for reconsideration in legislatures across the country.
Will Lorensen*

*

J.D., West Virginia University College of Law, 2017. 1 would like to thank the members of

the West Virginia Law Review for their hard work throughout the publication process. Without
their patience, this Note would just be an idea. I would also like to thank every professor,
supervisor, and colleague that has taken the time to edit and critique my work. Without their
insight, my writing would be incoherent. Finally, I am forever grateful for the unconditional love
of my friends and family. Without their support .. . well, I don't care to speculate.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2017

27

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 120, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 9

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol120/iss2/9

28

